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a b s t r a c t
Safe and successful completion of complex projects in industrial environments requires careful planning
and collaboration of different stakeholders. This paper presents the integration of three methods (task
analysis, safety analysis, and project optimisation) to apply a holistic approach to complex project planning. The attributes and limitations of the separate elements are discussed, and a case study applying the
integrated methodology is presented. The results from the case studies indicate that significant benefits
in terms of time, cost and safety can be achieved through the application of the integrated methodology.
Ó 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction
The safe and successful completion of maintenance and overhaul procedures is dependent upon the collaboration of different
departments and individuals, the clear planning of the work, and
the availability of the required resources. For complex or rarely
performed procedures, the competence and knowledge needed
for planning and mitigating the risks associated with the project
may be spread across different parts of the organisation. However,
accessing and utilising this knowledge is critical for de-risking
major projects and investments. Major projects, for example the
delivery of the London Olympic Park, are increasingly placing value
on the ability of suppliers and contractors to deliver projects with
the highest levels of safety (Shiplee et al., 2011) and the criticality
of safe performance of maintenance procedures is illustrated by
major accidents such as Piper Alpha, Clapham Rail Disaster, and
Texas Oil Refinery. However, Badri et al. (2012) state that project
management is often deficient in integrating safety risks. In a study
of 183 process industry major accidents, Okoh and Haugen (2014)
found that 44% had a link to maintenance and of these, deficient
planning/scheduling/fault diagnosis were a cause in 69%. Maintenance is also a factor in 15–20% of all occupational health and
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safety accidents, and 10–15% of all fatal accidents (OSHA, 2011).
The need for safer maintenance must also be balanced with the
business requirements for time and cost effective completion of
maintenance activities.
Previous research has focussed on identifying safety hazards as
part of the project planning process, and has had some success in
integrating the safety analysis with 4D models used to communicate and engage with project stakeholders (e.g. Benjaoran and
Bhokha, 2010; Gerbec et al., 2016a). This paper extends such work
by also incorporating uncertainty modelling using the Monte Carlo
technique, giving stakeholders the ability to assess the impact of
different resourcing choices on the project timescales and risk. This
paper presents a methodology for the elicitation of the information
required to fully plan a maintenance activity, assessing both safety
and efficiency goals, using a participatory approach that harnesses
the existing knowledge in the organisation and engages key stakeholders in planning activities to help ensure safe and timely completion of activities. The results of a case study application of a
maintenance overhaul procedure in an electricity generating station are also presented. The approach was developed under the
scope of the TOSCA (Total Operations for Safety Critical Activities)
project, which developed a set of principles, processes and tools to
support Total Safety Management (TSM; Kontogiannis et al., 2016).
TOSCA proposes the development of a Common Operational Picture supported by four safety pillars: commitment in action,
understanding risks and hazards, managing/treating risks, and

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ssci.2016.10.014
0925-7535/Ó 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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learning from experience. The methodology presented in this
paper contributes to commitment in action, through the use of participatory approaches, and understanding risks and hazards.
The methodology consists of three strands:
 A participatory workshop to produce a detailed task analysis of
the works, providing a basis for the plan;
 A participatory risk assessment based on the task analysis, to
identify risks and plan appropriate mitigations;
 A Monte Carlo simulation based on the task analysis, to provide
a cost-benefit analysis of the use of additional resources.
The participatory approach is designed to engage stakeholders
from across the organisation in the planning, and ultimately the
successful completion, of the maintenance project. This approach
draws strongly on the area of Participatory Ergonomics, an
approach concerning ‘‘the involvement of people in planning and
controlling a significant amount of their own work activities, with
sufficient knowledge and power to influence both processes and
outcomes in order to achieve desirable goals” (Wilson, 1995, p.
1071). Kuorinka (1997) describes the role of all those with firsthand experience of the problem in question to work together
towards problem solving, i.e. the participation of stakeholders.
The benefits of a participatory approach are improved design solutions incorporating the accumulated knowledge and experience of
the stakeholders, and improved acceptance of the solutions (Gyi
et al., 2015). Typically, Participatory Ergonomics approaches tackle
issues in the everyday operations of an organisation, such as production lines, using a wide variety of methods (Nagamachi,
1995). However, Kuorinka (1997) suggests that complex industrial
processes may also benefit from participatory approaches, particularly considering they are typically not well represented by the
procedural standards. In terms of safety management, participatory ergonomics approaches have been widely applied with the
objective of preventing musculoskeletal disorders (Yazdani et al.,
2015) but may also be effective in creating a strong safety culture
(Rocha et al., 2015). The participation of the workers in identifying
hazards and developing mitigations helps to engage workers in
safety, while increasing the realism of the safety assessment and
the practicality of the mitigation measures.
The data collection and analysis is based on bottom up estimation techniques (PMI, 2013) captured in a tabular task analysis that
is subsequently used as the basis of the risk assessment. Task analysis is the human factors equivalent of a functional analysis in systems engineering, where task analysis identifies and examines the
tasks performed by human operators when interacting with the
system (Kirwan and Ainsworth, 1992). As in a functional analysis,
decomposition of higher-level functions adds more detail and
allows system objectives to be allocated to lower-level functions.
Task analysis methods are widely used by human factors professionals for a variety of purposes, including risk assessment of
human activities and tasks within a system (Kirwan, 1998). Common task analysis representations include Hierarchical Task Analysis (HTA; Annett and Duncan, 1967), Link Analysis (Chapanis,
1996), Operational Sequence Diagrams (Kirwan and Ainsworth,
1992), Cognitive Task Analysis (CTA; Stanton et al., 2005) as well
as more general process and flow-chart techniques. The data for
these representations are usually captured through observations,
analysis of documentation, and/or interviews. Tabular task analysis
captures the data in a sequential list of tasks, broken down into
sub-tasks as necessary.
The completed task analysis can be used to structure a risk
assessment, where hazards can be identified and analysed for each
task documented in the task analysis. Hazard identification is
based on screening issues according to five types (offering prompts
specific for the domain) to identify possible issues connected with

each step of the task analysis using a structured workshop format.
This approach is similar to a HAZOP study (Kletz, 2006) in which
each part of a plant is examined in turn, but in this approach the
nodes are individual (sub)tasks instead of parts of a plant. The
approach can be referred to as Task HAZID (Leva et al., 2012;
Demichela et al., 2014; Gerbec et al., 2016a). The identification of
hazards can be accompanied with a semi-quantitative risk category estimation in order to separate between safety and productivity issues. This involves assigning the consequence classes on a
scale (e.g. 1–5), and similarly assigning their likelihood of occurrence, while risk values are simply provided by multiplying both.
The method allows the hazards associated with each task to be
identified in the form of possible deviations from the correct execution of the task. The consequences and likelihood of each deviation is explored, and finally mitigations identified where
appropriate.
Finally, a Monte Carlo optimisation based on discrete event simulation can be used to examine the possible impact of different
resource configurations. Discrete-event simulation models a process as a discrete sequence of well-defined events in time. Such
events occur at a particular instance in time, marking a state
change in the process (Robinson, 2004). Discrete-event processes
must include predetermined starting and ending points, and a list
of discrete events that occur in between these points. The task
analysis is ideally suited to providing these points. Discrete-event
simulation is commonly used to monitor or predict procedures
and processes in various industries, such as manufacturing. The
final aim of a simulation is to define a precise scheduling of the
listed tasks, considering all known external and internal constraints characterizing the whole activity to be organized. In order
to provide a highly reliable plan of the tasks, the simulation should
take into account a number of variables to consistently adhere to
reality. Uncertainties may be generated from the inability to precisely predict the duration of each task due to external constraints,
lack of knowledge, and the possibility of known or unknown issues
arising during the project. The participatory approach helps to elicit as much information as possible about the task sequence,
expected durations, and possible issues (including safety concerns)
and thereby reduce the uncertainty. Especially when the activity is
characterized by high level of internal and/or external constraints,
it is of extreme importance to include the uncertainty affecting the
hypothesis used to introduce those constraints in the simulation.
In the present case study, the main constraints refer to the mutual
conditioning of some subtasks (i.e. one task cannot be performed
unless another one is already complete), availability of resources
(e.g. people and tools) and the time of some external events necessary for accomplishing the procedure in safe conditions (i.e. time of
tides). In this sense, Monte Carlo (MC) method has been identified
as a suitable tool to run a discrete-event simulation under uncertainty since it allows the computation of a mean value and a variance of the given quantity under investigation. This quantity is
governed by a known phenomenon depending on a set of variables
characterized by a level of uncertainty (i.e. the input variables are
introduced as a set of mean values and a related variances or in
form of Probability Density Function, instead of a set of definite
values). MC computes a set of estimations of the final quantity
based on different values of input variables generated according
their Probability Density Function. Consequently, the final output
of the simulation will be an average of the quantity under investigation and a related variance depending on the variance of the
input variables. In this specific case, the exploitation of MC is very
advantageous for estimating the final planning of an activity taking
into account the uncertainty declared by the stakeholders about
the duration of each task. Indeed, the application of the Monte
Carlo optimisation gives a more nuanced result from the analysis
than is possible through the task and safety analysis. It allows dif-
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ferent options to be tested and the expected impact on the project
plan to be evaluated.
2. Integrated methodology
The proposed methodology is illustrated in Fig. 1. The initial
participatory workshop uses a first version of the project plan (if
available) to structure the workshop and elicit detail on the tasks
to be performed from beginning to end from all participants. The
outputs of the workshop are used to construct a detailed task analysis, forming the basis of the updated plan. This is then used to
structure a second participatory workshop, identifying the key
risks for each phase of the work and generating mitigation actions
in collaboration with the participants. A further update of the plan
is made after this workshop to make any adjustments required as
part of the mitigations. This second version of the plan is then used
to support the Monte Carlo analysis, which can be used to identify
critical activities and examine the impact of varying resource
levels.
The plan may be held in whatever format is most acceptable to
the particular organisation (e.g. Microsoft Project, Microsoft Excel,
Teamwork, Project Place, etc.). Table 1 describes the main inputs,
attendees, and outputs for the three main phases of the methodology. The workshops require representatives from all stakeholder
groups, particularly any different operational or maintenance
departments who will have to coordinate to complete the works.

It may also be useful to have representatives from any other maintenance projects scheduled to occur during the same timeframe.
The methodology described here was tested in a case study of a
cold water system overhaul in an electricity generation station. The
description of that case study and its results are discussed in the
next section.
3. Case study: Cold water system overhaul
The developed methodology was trialled within an electricitygenerating organisation in Ireland. The organisation regularly
undertakes maintenance and overhaul procedures during unit
outages at their generating stations. These complex works have
significant safety, productivity, and ultimately financial consequences if not successfully completed; however, detailed project
management is difficult due to lack of firm planning data, variation
in the work undertaken in each overhaul, the different departments involved in the works, time pressures associated with normal running of the plant, and the focus of engineering teams on
technical planning.
For this case study, the overhaul of a cold water system during
two overlapping unit outages was considered. The planned works
involved the replacement of two valves and the inspection and
repair of the busmain. The work must be undertaken during the
outage of two of the three generating units, so that reduced cooling
water flow is required for the overall station, enabling the isolation

Fig. 1. Participatory planning methodology.

Table 1
Inputs and Outputs.
Inputs

Attendees

Outputs

Workshop 1

Maintenance goals
Plan V0
Estimated resources
Known constraints
Schematics of the system

Project manager
Operations rep
Maintenance manager
Maintenance staff
Contractor rep
Facilitator

Task analysis
Plan V1
List of issues

Workshop 2

Plan V1
Safety analysis framework
List of issues

Project manager
Operations rep
Maintenance manager
Maintenance staff
Contractor rep
Facilitator

Plan V2
Safety analysis
List of mitigations

Monte Carlo

Plan V1 and Plan V2
List of issues

Project manager

Final Plan
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of the necessary parts of the cold water cooling system. The outage
of both units was initially planned for 5 days, leaving a short time
window in which to complete the work, and significant losses to
the plant would be incurred through lost revenues if start-up were
delayed. The time pressure associated with the works also
increases the likelihood of errors that may impact both safe and
timely completion of the work. The aim of this case study was to
provide a project plan for the overhaul procedure, based on the
participatory approach to engage all stakeholders and integrate
that plan with a risk assessment of the works covering safety, cost
and time. The resulting plan should account for individual tasks,
consider access to and use of resources, and identify the main risks,
in terms of operational delays and process safety, capable of undermining the successful outcome of the project.
The first participatory workshop was held approximately
2.5 months prior to the planned start date of the works. This workshop detailed the task analysis and also documented any risks and
mitigations that emerged in the course of the discussion, although
these were not the focus of this workshop. Additional one-to-one
meetings were held with key stakeholders over the following
months to clarify some remaining points and the plan was documented in the form of the task analysis and Gantt and PERT charts.
The second workshop was held one month prior to the works to
finalise the risk assessment. The Monte Carlo simulation was finalised approximately two weeks ahead of the works start date.
The initial workshop was designed to engage key stakeholders
and elicit the information needed for detailed planning. A basic
scale model of the CW system was used to structure the discussion
(Fig. 2). Participants were asked to use small figurines and toy
cranes to represent the progression of the tasks on the model. Each
participant was assigned one or more roles. This structured and
immersive approach helped to elicit and document each task needing to be completed during the works.
A full list of tasks, from when the second unit shut down
through to handing back of the CW system to operations, was elicited in the workshop and annotated with actors, tools and equipment and expected durations against each. Upper and lower limits
of the expected durations were also noted for the future optimisation. The data collected from the workshop was structured in an
Excel based tabular task analysis, highlighting questions for further
analysis and resolution. These were addressed offline in discussion
with key stakeholders.
This process resulted in a detailed plan for the works, which
was represented in both PERT and Gantt Charts. This plan was used
as the basis for a hazard identification (Task HAZID) workshop with
the same group of stakeholders considering likely hazards as a

prompt to identify all the possible risks associated with each task
so as to verify if any additional countermeasures may be necessary.
The Task HAZID study again involved a team workshop exercise
with the team containing the appropriate expertise, including
knowledge of the plant and the planned operation, safety analysis,
and human factors knowledge.
The five main guide categories of issues types used were:
 Logistical hazards: lack of resources (manpower, cranes, equipment,) unavailability of required parts, damage of required
parts and or equipment, space constrains/improper provision
for access ways and laydown areas, undetected faults.
 Mechanical hazards: moving parts and materials High pressure
fluids Fragment & liquid metal projection, FODs left in after
repairs, noise, vibrations, Improper weight support, quality of
welds, etc.
 Automation hazards: mis-calibration, undetected faults, etc.
 Process Safety hazards: dangerous substances, hot surfaces, loss
of containment, fire, ATEX, interlocks being disabled and not
reset.
 Electrical hazards: improper isolation, faulty connections, inadequate parts and fittings, arc flash.
 Other hazards: human performance, ergonomics and mechanical lift supports, confined spaces, external weather conditions
or microclimate considerations, etc.
In the case study presented here, the Task HAZID and risk categorization was carried out in a simple spreadsheet template, which
facilitates an examination of each node in the task analysis, allowing each deviation to be documented and analysed. The capability
of holding the full analysis in one template streamlines the analysis
and simplifies the documentation of the analysis itself. The impact
of each identified risk was considered in terms of Cost, Time, and
Safety and rated according to its perceived likelihood and severity,
using the following scales (Tables 2 and 3).
The risk matrix (Table 4) was used to calculate the overall risk
score, by cross-referencing the assessed likelihood and severity.
The red indicates high risks that must be addressed with actions
to reduce the risk. Amber risks should be reduced if practical, while
green risks can be accepted, although any further risk reduction
measures that can be implemented easily and cost-effectively
should still be considered. This risk matrix, as well as the severity
and frequency tables used, was aligned with those used more
widely for safety management within the organisation.
Finally, an Excel-based Monte Carlo simulation was run on the
basis of the task outline, the estimated durations and the required

Fig. 2. Scale model of CW system.
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Table 2
Likelihood table.
Likelihood
Rating

Name

Description

Quantification

1
2
3
4
5

Unlikely
Remote
Possible
Probable
Frequent

Could happen but never heard of in the industry
Has occurred in the industry
Has occurred in the company
Has occurred several times a year in the company
Has occurred several times a year in the location

<10 6 ev/yr
10 6–10 4 ev/yr
10 4–10 1 ev/yr
10 1–1 ev/yr
>1 ev/yr

Table 3
Severity table.
Consequences

1
2
3
4
5

Safety

Cost

Time

Minor injury
1–2 day LTA
Serious injury
1 fatality, permanent incapacity
Multiple fatalities

<10 k €
>10 k €
>50 k €
>200 k €
>1 M €

<3 h delay
<8 h delay
<24 h delay
<1 week delay
>1 week delay

Table 4
Risk matrix.

Likelihood

Risk
5

5

10

15

20

25

4

4

8

12

16

20

3

3

6

9

12

15

2

2

4

6

9

10

1

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

Severity

availability of resources, using a triangular distribution to describe
the expected, upper and lower durations. Where upper and lower
limits had been captured during the workshop, these were used;
otherwise upper and lower limits were defined as 1.1 and 0.9 of
the expected duration respectively.
3.1. Results
The workshop broke the works down into eight distinct phases
of the revamping procedure:
Z. Preparation;
A. River Isolation;
B. Draining and preparation of the coldwater pipework;
C. Removal of the valves (1/2 NRV and CW1/2 isolation valve);
D. Inspection and repairs;
E. Installation of the new valves;
F. Commissioning;
G. Removal of river isolation.
The PERT chart of the project is shown in Fig. 3.
Under this current plan, the project was expected to be completed at 2330 on Tuesday 11th August, or 87.5 h (3 days, 15.5 h)
after the estimated start time of 0800 on Saturday 8th August fol-

lowing the planned outage of two of the three power generation
units in the station. The critical path is shown in red.
The PERT includes scheduled break times for those activities
scheduled to fall at break time. These are shown in blue in the
duration boxes. The plan is slowed by the need to wait for
resources on three occasions:
1. C3: Only one crane is available and this is needed simultaneously to lift and hold both valves during their removal (C2,
C3). Therefore, the removal of one valve will have to wait for
the crane to become available. In the PERT, this valve is the
NRV, putting the remaining activities involving the NRV on
the critical path. If the NRV is instead removed first, the remaining Isolation valve tasks will instead be on the critical path.
2. D4: The repair teams work only dayshifts, but to complete the
repair of the Isolation valve flange face would require working
through the night. A wait time of 12 h has been added to
account for this time.
3. D5: Again, the repair team is not available to start work at 2330
(the scheduled removal time of the NRV) and this task must
wait to begin at 0800.
Fig. 4 shows a Gantt chart summarising the overall procedure
stages and duration.
The risk assessment based on the detailed plan identified 10
green risks and 18 amber risks. The green risks were deemed to
be sufficiently well mitigated and were not further analysed.
Examples of amber risks included:
 A delay in the operational isolation (Likelihood: 3, Severity: 3;
Risk = 9). The operations team are likely to have a high workload after the unit comes off load and may not be able to provide the isolation in the required timeframe, causing a delay
to the work. A dedicated operator, and clear planning of the
works were the recommended control measures for this risk.
 Diver injury (L: 2, S: 4; R = 8). The cleaning of the shutes is a
high-risk activity, and there is the possibility of an injury to
the divers. The recruitment of an experienced diving team and
careful monitoring of their planning and risk assessment should
mitigate this risk.
 High winds prevent crane use (L: 3, S: 2; R = 6). High winds may
prevent the crane from dropping the river isolation gates into
place, causing a short delay to the works until the winds die
down. The only possible mitigation is to check weather conditions in advance of the works to determine the possible impact
and whether to continue.
 Damage to existing pipework around the valve being removed
(L: 3, S: 3; Risk = 9). The removal of the large valves using the
crane holds the potential to damage the remaining pipework.
Procedures for the careful removal of the valves were developed
to manage this risk.
 Lifting hooks unable to hold valve weight (L: 2, S: 3; R = 6). The
lifting hooks may have become degraded over the course of
time and may not be able to take the full weight of the valves.
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Fig. 3. PERT diagram.

Gantt - CW revamping procedure
4:00 10:00 16:00 22:00 4:00 10:00 16:00 22:00 4:00 10:00 16:00 22:00 4:00 10:00 16:00 22:00

Preparation
River Isolation
Draining and Preparation of pit
Remove valves
Inspection and Repair
Install new valves
Commissioning
Remove gates

Fig. 4. Gantt for overall operations.

Inspection of the lifting hooks prior to the works is recommended and the use of a sling around the body of the valve.
 Inhalation of toxic gas formed during cureing (L: 2, S: 3;
Risk = 6). A toxic atmosphere may form in the pipes during
the cureing phase of the repair works. Force ventilation should
be installed to mitigate this risk;
 Injury of operator during blasting operations (L: 2, S: 3; R = 6).
Operator PPE should be available and in use to prevent injury.
A Monte Carlo simulation of the planned works was run, using
the expected, maximum and minimum values for each task as collected in the initial workshop and follow up visits. The simulation

used had two main constraints on its realism. First, break times
cannot be accounted for in the current simulation. This was dealt
with by adding 3 h to every 24 h of the final expected time. Second,
the simulation assumes all resources are available 24 h, so cannot
account for the repair teams only being available during the dayshift. Nevertheless, the simulation provided some useful results.
Averaging over 20 runs, the simulation expects the work to be
completed at 2240 on Tuesday 11 August. This is very close to
the expected time as calculated in the PERT, and suggests that
the simulation is reasonably accurate despite the constraints.
If a second crane were to be used, the averaged result of the
simulation suggests that the time required for completion could
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actual works respectively. The actual duration of the works exactly
matched the expected duration, although this was likely a coincidence given the variation in individual tasks.
The majority of tasks were within the expected timeframe, with
most tasks generally at the lower end of the expected duration.
Phase B (Prep of pit) was the only phase completed more quickly
than the lower expected duration. This was due to a considerably
faster drainage time of water from the pit than anticipated. However, the durations in Table 5 do not include an 18 h delay to the
start of the tasks, due to the need to wait for an isolation from
operations. Phase C was completed in a time very close to the
expected duration, however several of the tasks in Phase C had
been planned in parallel, but were completed in series. The actual
tasks of removing the individual valves were completed in a time
closer to the lower expected limit (i.e. 5–6 h actual duration per
valve; expected durations were 8–10 h, with a lower limit of 5 h
and upper limit of 13.5 h). Phase D, Inspection and Repair, took
longer than the expected duration, although still within the set
limits. This was due to the completion of tasks in series that had
been planned in parallel. Similarly with Phase E, installation of
new valves, although the planned and actual durations are similar,
in fact the tasks were completed close to the lower time estimate,
but were completed in series rather than parallel, as had been
planned. Phase F, Commissioning, took slightly longer than the
expected duration, due to the removal of the isolation. Finally,
Phase G, Remove Gates, exceeded the upper expected duration.
This was due to longer than expected times to remove the pumps
from the system and to equalise water pressure with the river.
A final note on the accuracy of the estimation method is to compare the bottom-up estimate used to an initial top-down estimate
prepared by the project leader. This estimated the works to take
11 days, a vast overestimation in comparison with the eventual
bottom-up estimation, and an overestimation even compared to
the relaxed pace of the actual project completion. While this
11 day estimate was an initial estimate and may reflect lack of
accuracy at that point, it is also likely that the detailed decomposition facilitated a more accurate analysis of the final duration. This
is interesting in the context of Besner and Hobbs (2004) finding
that top-down estimating is more widely used the bottom-up
estimating.
Overall, the durations were within tolerance, and the planned
procedure provided a good estimate of the actual performance.

decrease by 7 h, anticipating the return to operation to 1530 on
Tuesday 11 August. The use of the third repair team makes little
difference on its own, but the use of three repair teams and a second crane makes the completion time a full 12 h earlier, at 1000 on
Tuesday 11 August.
3.2. Validation
The approach was validated against the actual works as completed. The primary objective of the study was to de-risk the project by identifying the tasks, resources, and risks in detail and
ensuring the necessary measures were in place to maximise the
probability of safe and successful project completion.
The main criterion was satisfied, in that the project was successfully completed during the outage. However, this is not sufficient to validate the method and additional analysis of the
planned versus actual project completion was performed to this
end. Feedback was also collected from key stakeholders.
3.2.1. Duration comparison
The work was calculated to take approximately 4 days (3 days,
15.5 h), but in actuality took 7 days. The change in overall timescale was ascribed to additional time becoming available for the
outage, due to overrunning of other planned works, allowing the
schedule to be relaxed. Key differences were a delay to the start
of Phase B, not working 24 h shifts, and not running major tasks
in parallel. Table 5 describes the expected duration for each phase
of works, compared with the actual duration (not including breaks)
and Figs. 5 and 6 describe the overall timeline of the planned and

Table 5
Expected vs. actual task durations.
Task

Expected duration

Actual duration

A. River isolation
B. Prep of pit
C. Remove valves
D. Inspection and repair
E. Installing new valves
F. Commissioning
G. Remove gates

19.5 h (12.5–26 h)
13 h (11–16 h)
11 h (6–15.5 h)
14 h (12–31 h)
13 h (6.5–16.5 h)
7 h (5.5–11 h)
2.5 h (2–5 h)

13.5 h
8h
12 h
19 h
13 h
9h
5.5 h

Totals

80 h (56–121 h)

80 h

Planned Timescales
River Isolation
Prep of pit
Remove valves
Inspection and
Repair
Installing new
valves
Commissioning
Remove gates
0:00

0:00

Saturday

0:00

Sunday

0:00

Monday

0:00

0:00

Tuesday

Fig. 5. Planned timescales.
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Actual Timescales
River Isolation
Prep of pit
Remove valves
Inspection and Repair
Installing new valves
Commissioning
Remove gates

0:00

0:00
Thurs

0:00
Fri

0:00
Sat

0:00
Sun

0:00
Mon

0:00
Tues

0:00
Weds

Fig. 6. Actual timescales.

3.2.2. Risk analysis
The risk analysis carried out in the Task HAZID workshop identified 18 amber risks to the works. Additional risks were identified
and mitigated during the initial task analysis, and in fact this
approach is more integrated and appeared to offer a more natural
way for stakeholders to consider the possible deviations and controls as they developed the plan. However, a drawback of the risk
assessment based on the detailed task analysis was the fixation
of stakeholders on individual deviations, rather than global risks
to the project. These were under-represented, and key risks which
did later manifest, such as the delay to the outage start time and
the overrunning of another project during the outage (which in fact
had positive consequences on the project), were not identified. The
risk analysis aspect of the approach therefore needs to be reconsidered, with perhaps a brainstorming session before or after
the completion of the task analysis to identify wider risks to the
project as well as risks to individual tasks within the project.
3.2.3. Cost benefit analysis
The planning and optimisation work conducted for the case
study is estimated at 1 project manager (engineer) month of effort
(i.e. 20 days), with a gross salary of €5000. This includes the time of
the various stakeholders (project manager, four engineers, operations supervisor, technician) for two workshops and an additional
6 days of effort by the project manager to analyse the data and generate the plan.
In contrast, an overrun of one day is estimated at €250,000 in
lost earnings for the station and the analysis helped ensure that
the work could be completed within the available time window.
The risks identified to the project calculated the potential risk
exposure of up to €102,035, based on a multiplication of the frequency and severity scores determined in the risk workshop. The
cost benefit analysis therefore clearly demonstrates the value of
the pre-planning and analysis work in de-risking the project.
3.2.4. Feedback
Key stakeholders gave very positive feedback on the approach,
with comments including:
‘‘I firmly believe that the attention to detail highlighted in your submissions prior to the project helped us to complete the work safely
and without delay”
‘‘Input made a huge difference and the CW was one of the jobs during our recent outage that had a very successful outcome”

Specific benefits of the approach were:
 Early engagement and motivation of stakeholders across the
plant, ensuring tasks and activities were clear and achievable
during the works;
 Clear planning that identified pre-work and resources required
to de-risk the works;
 Confidence on what was possible in the time window available,
enabling re-planning decisions to be made smoothly during the
outage when required.
4. Discussion and conclusions
This paper has presented a methodology for the integration of
safety analysis with project planning for maintenance procedures.
The need for such a methodology is clearly demonstrated by the
high number of process and occupational safety accidents occurring during maintenance activities, and the contribution of poor
planning to those accidents (Okoh and Haugen, 2014). The
approach presented here aims to engage key stakeholders through
participatory workshops, to capture their knowledge and expertise
in developing a plan and to promote coordination between different stakeholder groups. Capturing the knowledge elicited in the
workshops in a project plan allows the key issues to emerge and
different options to be tested ahead of the works.
The case study presented in this paper represents a complex
maintenance procedure involving several different stakeholder
groups and operating under tight constraints. The workshop
approach was very successful in engaging the plant personnel,
and allowed key efficiency and safety risks to be identified, discussed, and mitigated ahead of the works. Although the eventual
works did not follow the plan exactly, the clear documentation of
the tasks and risks allowed the maintenance team to adapt to
changing circumstances with confidence.
It was not possible to include all stakeholders in the workshops,
in particular it was difficult to access contractor staff in this context and this is likely to be the case in many organisations. This
limitation was overcome by documenting assumptions or questions for the contractor staff, and directing these queries to the relevant contractors after the workshops. However, it would have
been preferable to better engage contractors directly in the whole
planning procedure. Indeed, the inclusion of as many stakeholders
as possible in the workshops is preferable since this will help to
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reduce uncertainties and assumptions, and result in more realistic
results. A second limitation was the linear nature of the case study
followed, which limited the potential benefits of the optimisation
methods. Future research should consider less linear projects in
order to demonstrate the additional benefits of optimisation. The
MC analysis should also be improved to account for break patterns
and to incorporate the risks identified.
Overall, the application of the integrated methodology in the
case studies described in this paper has demonstrated the potential
benefits in terms of increased safety, cost savings, and time savings. The individual methods described are all available to organisations at little or no additional cost, and the use of workshops
with key stakeholders serves not only to elicit the necessary information for better project planning, but also to engage the stakeholders in the project, highlight the key risks and motivate
stakeholders to work together to ensure project success. The
approach was positively received and showed its ability to provide
an accurate and detailed plan of proposed works. The methods
used are a combination of tried and trusted project management,
human factors, and risk assessment methods, but could easily be
adopted to support more advanced risk analysis techniques, such
as the Integrated Dynamic Decision Analysis (IDDA; Demichala
and Camuncoli, 2014) or Bayesian Networks (e.g. Gerbec et al., in
press). The combination and use of the methods in a participatory
manner provides a stronger result with better engagement from
key stakeholders, resulting in increased motivation for a successful
project conclusion.
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